Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences

Victorien Barbet (), Renaud Bourlès () and Juliette Rouchier ()
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Victorien Barbet: Aix-Marseille University, CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, AMSE
Juliette Rouchier: LAMSADE, CNRS, [UMR 7243], Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 2020, vol. 30, issue 2, No 8, 478 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study the dynamics of risk-sharing cooperatives among heterogeneous agents. Based of their knowledge on their risk exposure and the performance of the cooperatives, agents choose whether or not to remain in the risk-sharing agreement. We highlight the key role of other-regarding preference (altruism and inequality aversion) in stabilizing less segregated (and smaller) cooperatives. Limited knowledge and learning of own risk exposure also contributes to reducing segregation, the two effects (of learning and other-regarding preferences) being complementary. Our findings shed light on the mechanisms behind risk-sharing agreements between agents heterogeneous in their risk exposure.

Keywords: Agent-based; Cooperative; Risk-sharing; Learning; Altruism; Other-regarding preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D64 D82 D83 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Informal risk-sharing cooperatives: the effect of learning and other-regarding preferences (2020)
Working Paper: Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives: The Effect of Learning and Other-Regarding Preferences (2017)
Working Paper: Informal Risk-Sharing Cooperatives: The Effect of Learning and Other-Regarding Preferences (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00191-019-00644-9

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