On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

Daniel Friedman

Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1998, vol. 8, issue 1, 15-43

Abstract: Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.

Keywords: Evolutionary games; Adjustment dynamics; ESS; Evolutionary equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B25 C62 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-03-26
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (187)

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