R&D Incentives and Market Structure: Dynamic Analysis

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini ()

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2005, vol. 126, issue 1, No 5, 85-96

Abstract: Abstract We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D investment increases monotonically with the number of firms. This Arrowian result contradicts the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic.

Keywords: Differential games; Optimal control; Research and development. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

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Working Paper: R&D Incentives and Market Structure: A Dynamic Analysis (2004)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-005-2659-0

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