Power Measures and Solutions for Games Under Precedence Constraints

Encarnación Algaba (), René Brink () and Chris Dietz ()
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Encarnación Algaba: Escuela Superior de Ingenieros
René Brink: VU University
Chris Dietz: VU University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2017, vol. 172, issue 3, No 14, 1008-1022

Abstract: Abstract Games under precedence constraints model situations, where players in a cooperative transferable utility game belong to some hierarchical structure, which is represented by an acyclic digraph (partial order). In this paper, we introduce the class of precedence power solutions for games under precedence constraints. These solutions are obtained by allocating the dividends in the game proportional to some power measure for acyclic digraphs. We show that all these solutions satisfy the desirable axiom of irrelevant player independence, which establishes that the payoffs assigned to relevant players are not affected by the presence of irrelevant players. We axiomatize these precedence power solutions using irrelevant player independence and an axiom that uses a digraph power measure. We give special attention to the hierarchical solution, which applies the hierarchical measure. We argue how this solution is related to the known precedence Shapley value, which does not satisfy irrelevant player independence, and thus is not a precedence power solution. We also axiomatize the hierarchical measure as a digraph power measure.

Keywords: Game theory; Cooperative TU-game; Precedence constraint; Irrelevant player independence; Power measure; 91A12; 91A43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-016-1057-0

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