The SD-prenucleolus for TU games
J. Arin (franciscojavier.arin@ehu.es) and
I. Katsev (katsev@yandex.ru)
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2014, vol. 80, issue 3, 307-327
Abstract:
We introduce and characterize a new solution concept for TU games: The Surplus Distributor Prenucleolus. The new solution is a lexicographic value although it is not a weighted prenucleolus. The SD-prenucleolus satisfies core stability, strong aggregate monotonicity, null player out property in the class of balanced games and coalitional monotonicity in the class of monotonic games with veto players. We characterize the solution in terms of balanced collections of sets and we provide a simple formula for computing it in the class of monotonic games with veto players. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Keywords: TU games; Prenucleolus; Monotonicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:80:y:2014:i:3:p:307-327
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-014-0482-9
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