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Full-information best choice game with hint

Marek Skarupski ()
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Marek Skarupski: Wrocław University of Science and Technology

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2019, vol. 90, issue 2, No 1, 153-168

Abstract: Abstract In the classical full-information best choice problem a decision maker aims to select the best opportunity. His decision is based only on the exact values of the observed sequence. In this paper we consider two modifications of the above problem. We add a second player who can either propose additional information or block the observed object and demand an extortion. Our goal is to establish an optimal reward for the second player and the best moment to interrupt the decision process. The situation when the number of observations tends to reach infinity has been studied.

Keywords: Optimal stopping; Best choice problem; Matrix game; Markov chain; Threshold strategy; 90C40; 60G40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-019-00666-w

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