Emission reduction and coordination of a dynamic supply chain with green reputation

Jun Wang (), Qian Zhang (), Xinman Lu (), Rui Ma (), Baoqin Yu () and Huming Gao ()
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Jun Wang: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Qian Zhang: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Xinman Lu: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Rui Ma: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
Baoqin Yu: Yango University
Huming Gao: Tianjin University of Finance and Economics

Operational Research, 2022, vol. 22, issue 4, No 26, 3945-3988

Abstract: Abstract The public’s increasing concern for carbon emissions promotes supply chain operations toward sustainability. This study investigates a dynamic supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, wherein a product marked with emissions is produced and sold to consumers. A Stackelberg differential game is modeled, and the equilibrium pricing and emission reduction solutions are compared between integrated and decentralized channel settings. A two-part tariff contract is further proposed to improve channel performance. The numerical analysis illustrates that the emission reduction level, green reputation, demand, and entire profit of the supply chain are larger in the integrated setting than the counterparts in the decentralized setting. However, the relationship between the two channels in terms of retail price depends on unit carbon tax. In addition, the two-part tariff contract can perfectly achieve channel coordination. Results also indicate that firms can benefit from increasing the effect of green reputation on demand.

Keywords: Green supply chain; Green reputation; Emission reduction; Supply chain coordination; Two-part tariff; 91A23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s12351-021-00678-7

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