Endogenous timing of moves in an asymmetric price-setting duopoly

Attila Tasnádi

Portuguese Economic Journal, 2003, vol. 2, issue 1, No 2, 23-35

Abstract: Abstract. This paper adds to the growing literature on endogenous timing of decisions in duopolies. We show for a price-setting duopoly game with sufficiently asymmetric and strictly convex cost functions that the less efficient firm moves first while the more efficient moves second with a higher price than the less efficient firm.

Keywords: Price-setting games; Price leadership; Dominant firm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10258-002-0018-3

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