The impact of dependence among voters’ preferences with partial indifference

Erik Friese, William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley and Achill Schürmann ()
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Erik Friese: University of Rostock
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware
Achill Schürmann: University of Rostock

Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2017, vol. 51, issue 6, No 22, 2793-2812

Abstract: Abstract Standard weighted scoring rules do not directly accommodate the possibility that some voters might have dichotomous preferences in three-candidate elections. The direct solution to this issue would be to require voters to arbitrarily break their indifference ties on candidates and report strict rankings. This option was previously found to be a poor alternative when voters have completely independent preferences. The introduction of a small degree of dependence among voters’ preferences has typically been found to make a significant reduction of the impact of such negative outcomes in earlier studies. However, we find that the forced ranking option continues to be a poor choice when dependence is introduced among voters’ preferences. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that other voting options like Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules have been found to produce much better results. These observations are made as a result of using a significant advancement in techniques that obtain probability representations for such outcomes.

Keywords: Partial indifference of voters; Weighted scoring rules; Condorcet efficiency; Impartial culture and impartial anonymous culture (IC and IAC); Polyhedral computations; Ehrhart theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Working Paper: The Impact of Dependence among Voters’ Preferences with Partial Indifference (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11135-016-0446-7

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