Blockholder exit threats in the presence of private benefits of control
Ole-Kristian Hope (okhope@rotman.utoronto.ca),
Han Wu (wu@hec.fr) and
Wuyang Zhao (wuyang.zhao13@rotman.utoronto.ca)
Additional contact information
Ole-Kristian Hope: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Han Wu: HEC Paris
Wuyang Zhao: Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Review of Accounting Studies, 2017, vol. 22, issue 2, No 11, 873-902
Abstract:
Abstract Exit theory predicts a governance role for outside blockholders’ exit threats, but this role could be ineffective if managers’ potential private benefits exceed their loss in stock-price declines caused by the blockholders’ exits. We test this prediction using the Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) in China, which provided a large exogenous and permanent shock to the cost for outside blockholders to exit. We find that firms whose outside blockholders experience an increase in exit threats improve performance more than those whose outside blockholders experience no increase. The governance effect of exit threats also is ineffective in the group of firms with the highest concern for private benefits of control. Finally, a battery of theory-motivated tests shows that the documented effects are unlikely explained by outside blockholder intervention or some well-known intended effects of SSSR.
Keywords: Exit theory; Private benefits of control; Operating performance; China; Split-share structure reform (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 F30 G30 G31 G32 G34 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-017-9394-2
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