Collective wealth and group identity: insights from stratification economics

Patrick Mason, James B. Stewart () and William Darity
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James B. Stewart: Institute of Race, Power, and Political Economy, The New School

Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, 2022, vol. 3, issue 3, 463-491

Abstract: Abstract Informed by insights drawn from stratification economics and deploying dynamic game theory, we project the long-term outcome of racial/ethnic wealth disparities under multiple policy scenarios. At the core of the analysis is the character of investment individuals make in-group identity. The scenarios involve six regimes where color blindness is the norm, an equal opportunity principle is operative, the equal results principle prevails, strict apartheid is practiced, discrimination on the basis of phenotype is practiced, and a final scenario where reparations on behalf of the subordinate group have been implemented. Utilizing a series of simulation exercises, we explore the long-term outcomes on polarization, racialization, and wealth disparities under the reach of the scenarios.

Keywords: Stratification economics; Intergroup inequality; Intergroup rivalry; Long-run analysis; Dynamic game theory; Public policy; Reparations; Color-blind ideology; Equal opportunity; Equal results; Passing; “Tomming; ” Post-racialism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 J78 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s43253-022-00074-7

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