A coevolutionary approach to institutional lock-in

Vicente Moreno-Casas ()
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Vicente Moreno-Casas: Texas Tech University

Review of Evolutionary Political Economy, 2024, vol. 5, issue 3, 495-509

Abstract: Abstract Some countries get stuck in suboptimal trajectories and remain there for decades, a phenomenon known as institutional lock-in. In the evolutionary literature, institutional lock-in is explained by a unidirectional link between mental models (ideas, beliefs) and institutions. In contrast, the conventional non-evolutionary view considers institutions as exogenously given, with individuals choosing among them, implying another unidirectional link between mental models and institutions. In this paper, I develop a coevolutionary view of the institutional lock-in phenomenon, emphasizing the path-dependencies of both mental models and institutions and their mutual influence. I use this perspective to analyze the susceptibility of different political-economic systems to institutional lock-in. I conclude by hypothesizing that an ideal-type socialism is the most prone to lock in, followed by an ideal-type welfare state and an ideal-type free market system. Future research could test this framework through simulation models or empirical strategies.

Keywords: Institutional lock-in; Path-dependence; Mental models; Coevolution; Institutional change (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/s43253-024-00132-2

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