Persistence in corporate networks through boards of directors? A longitudinal study of interlocks in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom

Bénédicte Brullebaut (), Isabelle Allemand, Enrico Prinz and Florence Thépot
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Bénédicte Brullebaut: Burgundy School of Business (BSB)
Isabelle Allemand: Burgundy School of Business (BSB)
Enrico Prinz: University of Strasbourg
Florence Thépot: University of Glasgow

Review of Managerial Science, 2022, vol. 16, issue 6, No 3, 1743-1782

Abstract: Abstract This article studies, over the period 2006 to 2019, both the structure and the evolution of corporate networks built on shared board directors between the largest listed firms of three European countries: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. It offers a longitudinal and up-to-date analysis of the state of links between companies through examining interlocking directorates. Contrary to previous studies which have emphasized a decline of interlocks when analyzed at the board director level, we observe relative stability of these networks at the corporate level with a number of connected firms remaining quite stable despite a decline of board ties. As a result, the most central companies remain mainly the same at the national and international level over the considered period. Our findings provide evidence for the resource perspective: access to key resources seemingly pushes firms to continue their network participation despite strengthened national regulations on directors with multiple board seats. This evolution echoes the concept of weak ties of Granovetter (Am J Sociol 78: 360–1380, 1973). Lastly, it is worth noting that it cannot be affirmed that there has been an emergence of a cross-national network which operates to substitute national board ties.

Keywords: Interlocking directorates; Board interlocks; Corporate networks; Resource based view; Resource dependence theory; 15.04; 15BXX (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s11846-021-00490-9

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