Do Political Parties Play Dirty in the Discussion on Gender Balanced Boards? Evidence from Germany

Michael Olbrich (), Anna E. Nikolis (), David J. Rapp () and Katrin V. Weber ()
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Michael Olbrich: Saarland University
Anna E. Nikolis: Saarland University
David J. Rapp: Saarland University
Katrin V. Weber: Saarland University

Schmalenbach Business Review, 2016, vol. 17, issue 3, No 5, 399 pages

Abstract: Abstract Bar a few exceptions, the impact of political parties on corporate governance regulation has largely been ignored in research. The current paper aims to narrow that research gap by investigating the motives of parties involved in political discussions on corporate governance. Do the parties’ positions stem from the quest for general welfare, as they claim in their platforms, or from the ambition to maximize votes, as assumed by the Spatial Theory of party behavior in Rational Choice? We analyze the positions taken on the issue of gender balanced composition of supervisory and executive boards by six German political parties. Our findings cast doubt on the parties’ claim to act in the public interest and suggest their actual motive is the maximization of votes.

Keywords: Board diversity; Corporate governance; Female directors; Gender quota; Spatial Theory of party behavior; M14; M48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s41464-016-0017-4

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