Editorial decisions with informed and uninformed reviewers

Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez (), J. A. García and J. Fdez-Valdivia
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Rosa Rodriguez-Sánchez: Universidad de Granada
J. A. García: Universidad de Granada
J. Fdez-Valdivia: Universidad de Granada

Scientometrics, 2018, vol. 117, issue 1, No 3, 25-43

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, the interaction of the reviewers is analyzed in the context of the open peer review. There, the reviewer group can exchange comments on the manuscript. This group of experts is called the informed reviewer group because, with the exchange of comments, each reviewer knows about the trends in the evaluation of the manuscript. Then, we show that, in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the probability that the editor chooses to accept or reject is the same. In this paper, this reviewer group is also compared to a group of uninformed reviewers in the classic review system. In this second case, the uninformed reviewers only communicate with the journal editor. They always believe that their recommendation is in the majority, and the probability that the uninformed reviewers abstain from making any recommendation increases as the number of reviewers grows. In some open access journals, the editor can obtain recommendations by both uninformed and informed reviewers groups. In this situation, the editor’s decision could depend on the order followed by the editor in the analysis of the recommendations of each reviewers group (informed and uninformed). A free online tool has been created to help the editor with this process.

Keywords: Open peer-review; Open interaction; Informed reviewers; Uninformed reviewers; Bayesian Nash equilibrium; Editor’s decision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s11192-018-2875-7

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