The effect of firm performance on CEO compensation: the moderation role of SOE reform

Ngonadi Josiah Chukwuma (), Takuriramunashe Famba (), Huaping Sun (), Isaac Adjei Mensah (), Ophias Kurauone (), Liang Li () and Grace Chituku-Dzimiro ()
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Ngonadi Josiah Chukwuma: Jiangsu University
Takuriramunashe Famba: Jiangsu University
Huaping Sun: Jiangsu University
Isaac Adjei Mensah: Jiangsu University
Ophias Kurauone: Jiangsu University
Liang Li: Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology
Grace Chituku-Dzimiro: Zimbabwe Open University

SN Business & Economics, 2021, vol. 1, issue 11, 1-32

Abstract: Abstract As corporations expand, the owners (principals) delegate managers (agents) to manage their wealth on their behalf. Ceding the management authority to others means shareholders must institute mechanisms that keep their interests aligned with those of managers. One of such corporate governance mechanism that helps with the interest alignment goal is the compensation of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Although there are some previous studies on CEOs’ compensation, results from these studies are mixed. Most corporate governance studies suffer from endogeneity problems. Resultantly, the current study uses the dynamic panel system generalized methods of moments (SGMM) estimator to examine the moderation effect of SOE reforms on the nexus between firm performance and CEO compensation using a sample of 1265 non-financial public limited companies on the China Stock Market from 2010 to 2016. The result from the study shows that both current and past firm performances positively influence executive compensation contracts. Although the Renewed Mixed-Ownership Reform was launched at the 18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, its influence on executive compensation began to have material effect after issuing the operational guidelines in 2015. State ownership continued to decrease but remaining high only in strategic sectors. Finally, the extensive reforms positively influenced state ownership as an important governance mechanism in CEO compensation contracts after 2015.

Keywords: Executive compensation; SOE Reforms; Ownership Concentration; Board structure; Stock ownership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s43546-021-00160-8

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