The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable

Bilge Yilmaz and Murat Sertel
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Bilge Yilmaz: Finance Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 4, 615-627

Abstract: It is shown that the Majoritarian Compromise of Sertel (1986) is subgame-perfect implementable on the domain of strict preference profiles, although it fails to be Maskin-monotonic and is hence not implementable in Nash equilibrium. The Majoritarian Compromise is Pareto-optimal and obeys SNIP (strong no imposition power), i.e. never chooses a strict majority's worst candidate. In fact, it is "majoritarian approving" i.e. it always picks "what's good for a majority" (alternatives which some majority regards as among the better "effective" half of the available alternatives). Thus, being Pareto-optimal and majoritarian approving, it is majoritarian-optimal. Finally, the Majoritarian Compromise is measured against various criteria, such as consistency and Condorcet-consistency.

Date: 1999-08-31
Note: Received: 31 January 1995/Accepted: 22 July 1998
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