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Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences

Lars Ehlers

Social Choice and Welfare, 2002, vol. 19, issue 2, 325-348

Abstract: We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects - to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.

Date: 2002-04-10
Note: Received: 23 November 1998/Accepted: 20 October 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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