Yardstick competition and political agency problems

Paul Belleflamme and Jean Hindriks

Social Choice and Welfare, 2005, vol. 24, issue 1, 155-169

Abstract: We examine how yardstick competition between jurisdictions affects the agency problem resulting from uncertainty about politicians (adverse selection) and their policies (moral hazard). We find that yardstick comparison can contribute both to disciplining and to selecting politicians. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2005

Date: 2005
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Working Paper: Yardstick competition and political agency problems (2002)
Working Paper: Yardstick Competition and Political Agency Problems (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0297-8

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