p-Weakly constrained Pareto efficiency and aggregation in incomplete markets

Chenghu Ma () and Jiankang Zhang ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2013, vol. 41, issue 3, 605-623

Abstract: This paper studies aggregation and a weak form of optimality referring to the p-weakly constrained Pareto efficiency (p-WE) in stochastic finance economies with incomplete markets. We derive a representative agent utility function maximized at equilibrium and a characterization of the set of p-WE allocations. Moreover, we establish the correspondence between the set of competitive equilibrium allocations and the set of p-WE allocations. It is noted that these are accomplished for general time-state utility functions and without restrictions on the initial resource allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-012-0695-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:3:p:605-623

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0695-x

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().