A Clarke tax tâtonnement that converges to the Lindahl allocation

Matthew Van Essen

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 2, 309-327

Abstract: This paper uses the Clarke mechanism to construct an incentive compatible t âtonnement process which converges to the Lindahl allocation of a stylized public good economy when consumers have quadratic preferences. We show truth-telling to be an ex-post perfect equilibrium in the infinite horizon game induced by the tâtonnement. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: C72; D44; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:2:p:309-327

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0781-8

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