Axiomatic districting

Clemens Puppe () and Attila Tasnádi

Social Choice and Welfare, 2015, vol. 44, issue 1, 50 pages

Abstract: We study the districting problem from an axiomatic point of view in a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and geographical constraints. The axioms are normatively motivated and reflect a notion of fairness to voters. Our main result is an “impossibility” theorem demonstrating that all anonymous districting rules are necessarily complex in the sense that they either use information beyond the mere number of districts won by the parties, or they violate an appealing consistency requirement according to which an acceptable districting rule should induce an acceptable districting of appropriate subregions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Districting; Gerrymandering; Normative political analysis; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0824-9

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