A decomposition of strategy-proofness

Nozomu Muto () and Shin Sato ()
Additional contact information
Nozomu Muto: Yokohama National University
Shin Sato: Fukuoka University

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 2, No 3, 277-294

Abstract: Abstract Strategy-proofness has been one of the central axioms in the theory of social choice. However, strategy-proofness often leads to impossibility results. We find that strategy-proofness is decomposed into three axioms: top-restricted AM-proofness, weak monotonicity, and individual bounded response. We present possibility results by dropping individual bounded response from strategy-proofness. One of the results supports the plurality rule which is one of the most widely used rules in practice.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:47:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s00355-016-0959-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... c+theory/journal/355

DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0959-y

Access Statistics for this article

Social Choice and Welfare is currently edited by Bhaskar Dutta, Marc Fleurbaey, Elizabeth Maggie Penn and Clemens Puppe

More articles in Social Choice and Welfare from Springer, The Society for Social Choice and Welfare Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().