Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences

Tomoya Kazumura () and Shigehiro Serizawa

Social Choice and Welfare, 2016, vol. 47, issue 3, No 9, 633-663

Abstract: Abstract We consider the problem of allocating sets of objects to agents and collecting payments. Each agent has a preference relation over the set of pairs consisting of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environments where the wealth effect is non-negligible: the payment level changes agents’ willingness to pay for swapping sets. We investigate the existence of efficient and strategy-proof rules. A preference relation is unit-demand if given a payment level, for each set of objects, the most preferred one in the set is at least as good as the set itself; it is multi-demand if given a payment level, when an agent receives an object, receiving some additional object(s) makes him better off. We show that if a domain contains enough variety of unit-demand preferences and at least one multi-demand preference relation, and if there are more agents than objects, then no rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy for losers on the domain.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Multi-demand preferences; Unit-demand preferences; Non-quasi-linear preferences; Minimum price Walrasian rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-016-0986-8

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