On update monotone, continuous, and consistent collective evaluation rules

Edurne Falcó (), Madhuparna Karmokar (), Souvik Roy () and Ton Storcken ()
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Edurne Falcó: Virena Navarra S.L.
Madhuparna Karmokar: Indian Statistical Institute
Souvik Roy: Indian Statistical Institute
Ton Storcken: University of Maastricht

Social Choice and Welfare, 2020, vol. 55, issue 4, No 5, 759-776

Abstract: Abstract We consider collective evaluation problems, where individual grades given to candidates are combined to obtain a collective grade for each of these candidates. In this paper, we prove the following two results: (1) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and continuous if and only if it is a min-max rule, and (2) a collective evaluation rule is update monotone and consistent if and only if it is an extreme min-max rule.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-020-01263-1

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