Reduced-form budget allocation with multiple public alternatives

Xu Lang ()
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Xu Lang: Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

Social Choice and Welfare, 2022, vol. 59, issue 2, No 4, 335-359

Abstract: Abstract We consider a reduced-form implementation problem where two players bargain over how to allocate some resources among a finite set of social alternatives. Each player’s payoff depends on how much of the resources is allocated towards each alternative. Distributional constraints on some targeted groups of alternatives are allowed. Using a network flow approach, we provide a characterization of the reduced-form implementability condition. We show that our results can be useful to study public good problems with budget constraints where a joint implementation of private and public alternatives is possible.

Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-022-01398-3

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