A Short State of the Art on Multi-Leader-Follower Games

Didier Aussel () and Anton Svensson ()
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Didier Aussel: Université de Perpignan
Anton Svensson: Université de Perpignan

Chapter Chapter 3 in Bilevel Optimization, 2020, pp 53-76 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Multi-Leader-Follower games are complex optimization problems that mix a bilevel structure with one or more Nash games. Such kinds of models have been already described in the seminal book of H. von Stackelberg ((1934)Marktform und Gleichgewicht. Springer, Berlin); von Stackelberg et al. ((2011) Market structure and equilibrium. Springer, Heidelberg) and are known to perfectly fit to a lot of applications involving non cooperative situations with hierarchical interactions. Nevertheless it is only recently that theoretical and numerical developments for Multi-Leader-Follower problems have been made. This chapter aims to propose a state of the art of this field of research at the frontier between optimization and economics.

Keywords: Multi-Leader-Follower games; Generalized Nash games; Existence; Variational reformulation; Algorithms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_3

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