Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests

Martin Kaae Jensen ()
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Martin Kaae Jensen: University of Leicester

A chapter in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, 2016, pp 233-244 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Many important games are aggregative games which allows for robust comparative statics analysis even when the games do not exhibit strategic complements or substitutes (Acemoglu and Jensen, Games Econ Behav 81:27–49, 2013). This paper establishes such comparative statics results for contests improving upon existing results by (i) allowing payoff functions to be discontinuous at the origin, and (ii) allowing for asymmetric rent-seeking contests and patent races. A leading example where (i) is relevant is the classical Tullock contest (Tullock G (1980) Efficient rent-seeking. In: Buchanan JM, Tollison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp 97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Payoff Function; Positive Shock; Contest Success Function; Strategic Substitute (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_14

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