Public Good Games with Incentives: The Role of Reputation

Hannelore De Silva and Karl Sigmund
Additional contact information
Hannelore De Silva: WU Vienna, Department Finance and Accounting

Chapter 5 in Games, Groups, and the Global Good, 2009, pp 85-103 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Both the Trust Game and the Ultimatum Game reduce, in their most simplified versions, to a Public Good Game with an added incentive: namely a reward in the first case, and a sanction in the other. In this paper, the evolutionary game dynamics of these games is analyzed by means of the replicator equation. Positive and negative incentives have very different but complementary effects. We investigate the role of reputation, and show how occasional failures to contribute can lead to stabilizing cooperation.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Aspiration Level; Ultimatum Game; Payoff Matrix; Replicator Dynamic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540854364

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Series in Game Theory from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().