Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games
Edited by Pierre von Mouche () and
Federico Quartieri
in Springer Series in Game Theory from Springer, currently edited by Bernhard von Stengel
Date: 2016
ISBN: 978-3-319-29254-0
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Chapters in this book:
- Introduction
- Pierre von Mouche and Federico Quartieri
- On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
- Takeshi Yamazaki
- Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist
- Rein Haagsma
- Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses
- Nikolai Kukushkin
- Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment
- Richard Cornes and Takashi Sato
- On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs
- Pierre von Mouche
- Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games
- Takuya Iimura and Takahiro Watanabe
- On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly
- Ferenc Szidarovszky and Akio Matsumoto
- Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model
- Luis Corchon and Lourdes Moreno
- Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy
- Kojun Hamada
- Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets
- Alexander Vasin and Polina Kartunova
- Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly
- Ngo Long
- Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities
- Gian Italo Bischi, Fabio Lamantia and Elena Viganò
- Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests
- Martin Kaae Jensen
- Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups
- Federico Quartieri and Ryusuke Shinohara
- On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests
- Takeshi Yamazaki
- Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games
- Noriaki Matsushima and Takeshi Yamazaki
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spsgth:978-3-319-29254-0
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0
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