Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

Eric Kamwa and Issofa Moyouwou ()
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Issofa Moyouwou: University of Yaounde I

A chapter in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2021, pp 275-295 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox if some voters may seek to bring about a more preferable outcome by listing only a part of their sincere rankings on the competing candidates rather than listing their entire preference rankings on all the competing candidates. For three-candidate elections and for large electorates, under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), this chapter provides an evaluation of the likelihood of the truncation paradox occurring for the whole family of scoring rules and runoff scoring rules.

Date: 2021
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Working Paper: Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: the Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems (2021)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12

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