Bargaining and membership

María Gómez-Rúa and Juan Vidal-Puga

TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2014, vol. 22, issue 2, 800-814

Abstract: In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium. Copyright Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa 2014

Keywords: Bargaining; Coalitional games; Coalition structure; Owen value; Nash equilibrium; 91A10; 91A12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:22:y:2014:i:2:p:800-814

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DOI: 10.1007/s11750-013-0301-0

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