Optimally solving banks’ legacy problems

Anatoli Segura and Javier Suarez

No 96, ESRB Working Paper Series from European Systemic Risk Board

Abstract: We characterize policy interventions directed to minimize the cost to the deposit guarantee scheme and the taxpayers of banks with legacy problems. Non-performing loans (NPLs) with low and risky returns create a debt overhang that induces bank owners to forego profitable lending opportunities. NPL disposal requirements can restore the incentives to undertake new lending but, as they force bank owners to absorb losses, can also make them prefer the bank being resolved. For severe legacy problems, combining NPL disposal requirements with positive transfers is optimal and involves no conflict between minimizing the cost to the authority and maximizing overall surplus. JEL Classification: G01, G20, G28

Keywords: debt overhang; deposit insurance; non performing loans; optimal intervention; state aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-ias
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Related works:
Working Paper: Optimally solving banks' legacy problems (2019)
Working Paper: Optimally Solving Banks' Legacy Problems (2019)
Working Paper: Optimally solving banks' legacy problems (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:srk:srkwps:201996

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