Cartelization in gas markets. Studying the potential for a "Gas OPEC"

Steve A. Gabriel, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Rudolf Egging-Bratseth, Hakob Avetisyan and Sauleh Siddiqui ()

Discussion Papers from Statistics Norway, Research Department

Abstract: Natural gas is increasingly important as a fuel for electric power generation as well as other uses due to its environmental advantage over other fossil fuels. Using the World Gas Model, a large-scale energy equilibrium system based on a complementarity formulation, this paper analyzes possible future gas cartels and their effects on gas markets in a number of regions across the world. In addition, scenarios related to lower transport costs and decreased unconventional gas supply in the United States are considered.

Keywords: natural gas; market equilibrium; complementarity model; energy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 Q41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-ene
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Cartelization in gas markets: Studying the potential for a “Gas OPEC” (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ssb:dispap:638

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