On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

Vasiliki Skreta

Working Papers from New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics

Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure (2011)
Working Paper: On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (2007)
Working Paper: On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure (2007)
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