The Dynamic Wage Barganing Problem

Renuka Metcalfe ()

No 1106, School of Economics Discussion Papers from School of Economics, University of Surrey

Abstract: This paper considers dynamic equilibria in wage bargaining unifying for the first time the models of Coles and Wright (1998) and Pissarides and producing in contrast to the Coles and Wright model, a non-deficient equilibrium. In sharp contrast to the Pissarides model we analyse a fully dynamic model with non-linear cost functions and risk-averse agents, to provide overall, saddle-path stability and unique wage and employment outcome which is devoid of limit cycles.

Keywords: Wage determination; job matching; unemployment; labour markets; bargaining. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J23 J31 J40 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40 pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-dge and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sur:surrec:1106

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