Eliciting strategies in indefinitely repeated games of strategic substitutes and complements

Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School

Abstract: We introduce a novel method to elicit strategies in indefinitely repeated games and apply it to games of strategic substitutes and complements. We find that out of 256 possible unit recall machines (and 1024 full strategies) participants could use, only five machines are used more than 5 percent of the time. Those are “static Nash”, “myopic best response”, “Tit-for-Tat” and two “Nash reversion” strategies. We compare outcome data with “hot” treatments and find that the fact that we elicit strategies did not affect the path of play. We also discuss applications to IO literature and compare insights to previous literature on strategy elicitation mostly focused on the prisoner's dilemma.

Keywords: indefinitely repeated games; strategy elicitation; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=wps-03-2017.pdf&site=24 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sus:susewp:0317

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by University of Sussex Business School Communications Team ().