Distributional Implications of Geoengineering

Richard Tol

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School

Abstract: Greenhouse gas emission reduction is a global public good. The main problem is underprovision, and the inequitable distribution of the impacts of excessive climate change. Geoengineering is a private good with externalities. Individual countries, and indeed medium-sized organizations and companies, can geoengineer unilaterally and impose their preferred climate on others. In this paper, I use the FUND model to illustrate the implications, comparing and contrasting efficient, optimal, and equitable solutions to emission reduction and geoengineering.

Keywords: Climate change; geoengineering; efficiency; equity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sus:susewp:08316

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