Strategy Revision Opportunities and Collusion

Matthew Embrey, Friederike Mengel and Ronald Peeters

Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School

Abstract: This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if the game is of strategic substitutes. In contrast, there is a strong and positive effect for games of strategic complements. Revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations for this result.

Keywords: strategy revision opportunities; cooperation; repeated games; complements vs. substitutes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C92 D43 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategy revision opportunities and collusion (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sus:susewp:08716

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