Scoring Rules: A Game-Theoretical Analysis

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni () and Carlos Pimienta ()

No 2012-40, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one is for negative plurality games. The second one is for approval games under the condition that the number of candidates is equal to three. These results are combined with the analogous one obtained in De Sinopoli (2001) for plurality rule to show that, for generic utilities, three of the most well-known scoring rules, plurality, negative plurality and approval, induce finite sets of equilibrium outcomes in their corresponding derived games—at least when the number of candidates is equal to three. This is a necessary requirement for the development of a systematic comparison amongst these three voting rules and a useful aid to compute the stable sets of equilibria (Mertens, 1989) of the induced voting games. To conclude, we provide some examples of voting environments with three candidates where we carry out this this comparison.

Keywords: Approval voting; Plurality voting; Negative plurality; Sophisticated voting; Mertens Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2012-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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