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Coordination in the Network Minimum Game

Johannes Hoelzemann (j.hoelzemann@utoronto.ca) and Hongyi Li (hongyi@hongyi.li)
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Johannes Hoelzemann: Department of Economics, University of Toronto
Hongyi Li: School of Economics, UNSW Business School

Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gautam Bose

No 2021-02, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: Motivated by the problem of organizational design, we study coordination in the network minimum game: a version of the minimum-effort game where players are connected by a directed network. We show experimentally that acyclic networks such as hierarchies are most conducive to successful coordination. Introducing a single link to complete a network cycle may drastically inhibit coordination. Further, acyclic networks enable resilient coordination: initial coordination failure is often overcome (exacerbated) after repeated play in acyclic (cyclic) networks.

Keywords: organizational design; weak-link game; minimum-effort game; coordination failure; quantal response equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-net
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:swe:wpaper:2021-02

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