Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences

Anton Kolotilin, Roberto Corrao () and Alexander Wolitzky
Additional contact information
Roberto Corrao: Department of Economics, MIT

No 2023-07, Discussion Papers from School of Economics, The University of New South Wales

Abstract: In persuasion problems where the receiver’s utility is single-peaked in a one-dimensional action, optimal signals are characterized by duality, based on a first-order approach to the receiver’s problem. A signal that pools at most two states in each realization is always optimal, and such pairwise signals are the only solutions under a non-singularity condition on utilities (the twist condition). Our core results provide conditions under which higher actions are induced at more or less extreme pairs of states, so that the induced action is single-dipped or single-peaked on each set of nested pairs of states. We also provide conditions for the optimality of either full disclosure or negative assortative disclosure, where signal realizations can be ordered from least to most extreme. Methodologically, our proofs rely on a novel complementary slackness theorem for persuasion problems.

Keywords: persuasion; information design; duality; optimal transport; first-order approach; pairwise signals; twist condition; single-dipped disclosure; negative assortative disclosure; complementary slackness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82 pages
Date: 2023-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences (2022)
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