Payoff Dependent Dynamics and Coordination Games

Sung-Ha Hwang and Jonathan Newton

No 2016-12, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers populations of agents whose behavior when playing some underlying game is governed by perturbed best (or better) response dynamics with perturbation probabilities that depend log-linearly on payoffs, a class that includes the logit choice rule. A convention is a state at which every agent plays a strategy that corresponds to the same strict Nash equilibrium of the underlying game. For coordination games with zero payoffs off-diagonal, it is shown that the difficulty of leaving the basin of attraction of a convention can be well approximated by only considering paths of transitions on which an identical perturbation repeatedly affects one of the populations.

Keywords: Evolution; Coordination; Logit, Payoff dependence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games (2017)
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