Farsighted Objections and Maximality in One-to-one Matching Problems

Mert Kimya

No 202014, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: We characterize the set of stable matchings when individuals are farsighted and when they choose their objections optimally along a farsighted objection path. We use a solution concept called maximal farsighted set (MFS), which is an adaptation of the concepts developed in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and Dutta and Vartiainen (2020) to one-to-one matching problems. MFS always exists, but it need not be unique. There is a unique largest MFS that contains all other, which is equal to the largest consistent set of Chwe (1994). This implies that the largest consistent set embodies the idea of maximality in one-to-one matching problems.

Date: 2020-09, Revised 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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