General timing games with multiple players

Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait

No 2022-02, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: We examine innovation in an n-player market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. In our novel multi-player setup, we allow for heterogeneous payoffs between players and for a leader's payoff functions to be multi-peaked an non-monotonic, only requiring that followers' payoffs are non-increasing with the time of the leader's entry. We provide conditions for when equilibrium actions do not depend on historic payoffs, showing in this case that the n-player asymmetric game generates standard leader-maximized or preemption equilibria. In the two-player game we provide a complete characterization of the pure-strategy equilibria for when historic payoffs affects equilibrium actions (including the possibility of no equilibria in pure strategies). Finally, we relate our results to three applications from the literature.

Keywords: timing games; preempting entry, innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-mic
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