New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment

Stephen Cheung

No 2012-01, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished.

Keywords: strategy method; punishment; conditional cooperation; selfish bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment (2014)
Working Paper: New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment (2011)
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