A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems

Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa

No 2013-09, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: This paper considers marriage problems, roommate problems with nonempty core, and college admissions problems with responsive preferences. All stochastically stable matchings are shown to be contained in the set of matchings which are most robust to one-shot deviation.

Keywords: Learning, stochastic stability, matching; marriage; college admission. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-06, Revised 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems (2015)
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