Innovation in a generalized timing game

Vladimir Smirnov and Andrew Wait ()

No 2013-16, Working Papers from University of Sydney, School of Economics

Abstract: We examine innovation as a market-entry timing game with complete information and observable actions. We characterize all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria for the two-player symmetric model allowing both the leader's and the followers' payoff functions to be multi-peaked, non-monotonic and discontinuous. We provide sufficient conditions for when the equilibria can be Pareto ranked and when the equilibrium is unique. Economic applications discussed include process and product innovation and the timing of the sale of an asset.

Keywords: product innovation; process innovation; follower; leader; entry; timing games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-08, Revised 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-ino, nep-mic and nep-tid
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Innovation in a generalized timing game (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:syd:wpaper:2123/9340

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