Legitimacy Theory or Managerial Reality Construction? Corporate Social Disclosure in Marks and Spencer Plc Corporate Reports, 1969–1997
David J. Campbell
Accounting Forum, 2000, vol. 24, issue 1, 80-100
Abstract:
This paper sets out to make some comment on the debate surrounding explanatory theories for the phenomenon of voluntary social disclosure. It notes that two explanations appear from the literature to be most prominent: legitimacy theory and political‐economy of accounting explanations, both of which are consistent with a stakeholder understanding of the organization‐society relationship. The published annual corporate reports of the British retailer Marks and Spencer Plc are analyzed over the period 1969–1997 inclusive with a view to providing insight into the causes of variability in the volume of social disclosure. The scope of sample selection in previous empirical studies is discussed and commented upon. Methods of data capture used in this empirical analysis are discussed. The paper finds that whilst the expected upward trend in CSR is notable, the more interesting feature in the longitudinal analysis is the variability in disclosure between chairmen’s terms in office. It is argued that marginal variability of disclosure can be explained by the varying perceptions of reality of the successive chairmen. The limitations of existing theories as explicators of the observed phenomenon are briefly discussed.
Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:accfor:v:24:y:2000:i:1:p:80-100
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DOI: 10.1111/1467-6303.00030
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