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Auditor conservatism and reported earnings

Richard Chung, Michael Firth and Jeong-Bon Kim

Accounting and Business Research, 2003, vol. 33, issue 1, 19-32

Abstract: Conservatism is an underlying concept of financial accounting. We argue that the auditor forces conservatism on client companies and that the amount of conservatism depends on the economic performance of the company and on the type of audit firm. In particular, we contend that Big Six audit clients use more conservative accounting than non-Big Six audit clients when the clients are performing poorly (as reflected in stock prices). We attribute the more conservative accounting used by Big Six audit clients to the influence of the audit firm. By regressing excess earnings to price ratios on excess stock returns and other variables, we find evidence consistent with our hypothesis that Big Six auditors influence their clients to adopt more conservative accounting than non-Big Six auditors only when the clients' financial performance is worse than expected.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2003.9729629

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